Hamas’s Shadow Government
Why Hamas isn't demobilizing in Gaza—and why the west might let it slide
The second phase of the ceasefire in Gaza is nigh, and the prospects are bad.
The deal made in October 2025 started with a ceasefire, which was not fully observed by either side.
The second phase is supposed to see the disarmament of Hamas, the demilitarisation of Gaza, and the withdrawal of Israeli troops in favour of international administration through a local government.
However, some of the same leaders who had agreed the deal have always said they would never disarm or accept foreign administration.
Moreover, Hamas has continued to control parts of Gaza, and has prepared to retake control of the whole Strip.
Its strategy includes deflecting international efforts to replace it.
Indeed, international aid, as ever, partly enables bad actors to revive.
And of course, a failure to demilitarize enables Hamas to wield the stick as well as the carrot.
Israeli media quotes official sources saying that “Hamas recently strengthened its control over the Gaza Strip by stealing humanitarian aid and selling it to local residents, recruiting young men in mosques, collecting taxes, and kidnapping and torturing anyone who dares to speak out against the terror group.”
The most damning evidence, if authentic, is a memo sent by Hamas’ (expatriate) leadership to Hamas administrators in the Gaza Strip. According to the document, Hamas plans to control the Strip even while a new government is formed under international supervision.
The memo instructs Hamas’s civil administration officials to continue their regular activities “as if nothing has changed,” regardless of any other local or international administration.
The directive forbids officials from cooperating with, passing information to, or even commenting on the new government, except through channels controlled by Hamas leaders in exile.
So, the memo suggests, Hamas is intent on appearing to comply in principle from afar, but not in practice locally.
Taking the memo literally, we should expect Hamas leaders to sit on the various reconstruction programs and economic planning committees, alongside international and local technocrats, while Hamas administrators drag their feet on implementing anything agreed in those programs and committees.
Further, we should expect Hamas fighters to intimidate any Gazans who are rash or virtuous enough to cooperate with the technocrats.
Meanwhile, Hamas would rearm with local manufactures and smuggled imports from its foreign sponsors, ready for another attack on Israel. (October 2026 would mark the third anniversary of its invasion by parafoil and motorcycle, which cost Israel thousands of casualties.)
Whether or not the memo is genuine, the strategy contained therein is perfectly rational – not right, but rational.
So, in some way, the authenticity of the memo is a moot point. It might be apocryphal. The memo articulates what Hamas is already doing for its own survival. Anything else and Hamas would not be Hamas. It would be demilitarized and reduced to a civilian administrative arm of an un-Islamist government kowtowing to Western imperialists. And what self-respecting Islamist terror organization wants that?
Hamas’s strategy depends on some naivety or wilful blindness from the international community. Most countries can be expected to comply.
